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論文中文名稱:探討組織績效回饋、股份偏離權與外部董事參與之調節效果對家族企業多角化策略之影響 [以論文名稱查詢館藏系統]
論文英文名稱:The relationship between performance feedback and the moderating effects of ownership structure, outside directors involvement in family firms diversification strategy [以論文名稱查詢館藏系統]
院校名稱:臺北科技大學
學院名稱:管理學院
系所名稱:經營管理系碩士班
畢業學年度:106
畢業學期:第二學期
出版年度:107
中文姓名:鄭元瑞
英文姓名:Yuan-Jui Cheng
研究生學號:105578050
學位類別:碩士
語文別:中文
口試日期:2018/05/08
論文頁數:60
指導教授中文名:呂怜樺
指導教授英文名:Ling-Hua Lu
口試委員中文名:陳建丞;陳麗宇
口試委員英文名:Chien-Cheng Chen;Li-Yu Chen
中文關鍵詞:廠商行為理論家族企業股權結構外部董事參與多角化
英文關鍵詞:behavior theoryownership structuredivergenceoutside director involvementdiversification
論文中文摘要:廠商行為理論以績效回饋機制探討組織策略的選擇。由於決策制定者於決策制定過程中時常受到有限理性及資源有限的影響,因此透過績效回饋機制來決定策略的選擇為近年來學界重要的議題。本研究以家族企業為主要探討樣本,運用績效回饋機制以及家族情感財富探討家族企業多角化策略是否會因為面對不同績效回饋機制而產生不同的選擇。此外,股份偏離權以及外部董事的參與是家族治理股權結構以及面對公司治理制度改變的主要的特色,故本研究深度探討股權偏離以及外部董事的參與是否會對其績效回饋以及多角化策略產生調節作用。本研究以台灣公開發行上市公司之家族企業為樣本,透過1995至2015年長時間追蹤資料。研究結果顯示:家族企業面對正向績效回饋下減少多角化策略;家族企業面對負向績效回饋機制會產生不同的多角化選擇。股份偏離權於負向自我歷史績效回饋機制產生正調節;外部董事參與於負向產業社會績效回饋機制有正調節效果。
論文英文摘要:The behavioral theory of the firms proposed performance feedback mechanism to examine strategic changes. Because of bounded rationality and limit-resources, most decision makers rely on performance feedback to judge whether or not firms are now on the right track. In this study, we applied performance feedback mechanism and SEW (socioemotional welfare) perspective to examine how different performance feedback affects family firm’s diversification strategy. Samples are drawn on public listed family business in Taiwan during the year of 1995 to 2015. Our results show that when both performance feedbacks are positive, family firms will decrease diversification strategy, while when it faces negative performance feedback, firms will have different preference in family firm’s diversification strategy. In addition, the divergence between cash flow and control rights and outside boards involvement have partially moderating effects on the performance feedback and family diversification strategy.
論文目次:中文摘要 i
英文摘要 ii
目錄 iii
表目錄 v
圖目錄 vi
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究動機與目的 1
1.2 研究流程 4
第二章 文獻回顧與假說 5
2.1 廠商行為理論 5
2.1.1 組織預期水準與績效的落差 5
2.1.2 組織問題搜尋與寬裕資源 7
2.2 家族企業概述 13
2.3 社會情感財富 16
2.4 家族企業多角化相關文獻 . 19
2.4.1 假說推論 20
2.5 家族治理特色 23
2.6 外部董事的監督角色 27
第三章 研究方法 29
3.1 研究架構 29
3.2 資料來源與樣本期間 29
3.3 家族企業定義 30
3.4 變數的衡量 31
3.5 追蹤資料之實證研究方法 35
第四章 實證結果與分析 37
4.1 敘述統計分析 37
4.2 追蹤資料實證研究分析 39
4.3 穩健性測試 43
第五章 結論與建議 45
5.1 結論 45
5.2 研究貢獻 47
5.3 實務意涵 48
5.4 研究限制 49
5.5 建議 50
第六章 參考文獻 51
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