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論文中文名稱:股權結構與董事會效能對銀行業風險承擔與獲利能力之影響 [以論文名稱查詢館藏系統]
論文英文名稱:The Effect of Ownership Structure and Board Effectiveness on Risk-taking and Profitability of Banking Industry [以論文名稱查詢館藏系統]
院校名稱:臺北科技大學
學院名稱:管理學院
系所名稱:經營管理系碩士班
畢業學年度:100
出版年度:101
中文姓名:耿維禮
英文姓名:Wei-Li Keng
研究生學號:99578051
學位類別:碩士
語文別:中文
口試日期:2012-06-27
論文頁數:99
指導教授中文名:林淑玲
口試委員中文名:趙莊敏;侯家鼎
中文關鍵詞:股權結構董事會效能銀行業風險承擔銀行業獲利能力
英文關鍵詞:Ownership structureBoard effectivenessBank risk-takingBank profitability.
論文中文摘要:從2008年金融海嘯和過去三十年反覆的金融危機,這些事件突顯銀行傾向過度承擔風險的不穩定性質。本文專注於銀行風險承擔的動機背後的驅動力量-即股東的行為,將股東分為四種身分,分別是經理人、個人、非金融公司、金融公司,另外也探討董事會效能,所以本文的主要研究目的是使用台灣、香港與中國的數據探討股權結構與董事會效能對銀行業的風險承擔與獲利能力之影響。本文發現非金融公司持股率愈多,銀行業資產風險愈大,獲利能力也愈小;金融公司持股率愈多,銀行業違約風險愈小,但獲利能力也愈小;個人持股率愈多,違約風險愈小。董事會規模愈大,違約風險愈小。董監持股比率愈高,資產風險與違約風險愈小,但獲利能力愈小。獨立董事比率愈大,銀行業的資產風險降低,獲利提升。所以本文建議銀行業減少非金融公司持股率與提高獨立董事比率、董事會規模以及個人持股率。
論文英文摘要:The past three decades have been characterized by repeated banking crises, such as the 2008 financial crisis. Such episodes highlight the inherently unstable nature of banking and the tendency of banks toward excessive risk taking. In this paper, we focus on a driving force behind the risk-taking incentives of banks—namely, shareholders’ behavior and their incentives to take higher risk. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) in its consultative document, places the board as an essential part of bank regulatory reforms. Using detailed ownership data for a sample of Taiwan, China, Hong Kong’s commercial banks, this paper analyzes the link between ownership structure and risk and profitability in publicly held banks. We consider four categories of shareholders that are specific to our dataset. A higher equity stake of either individuals/families or banking institutions is associated with a decrease in default risk. In addition, non-financial companies impose the riskiest strategies when they hold higher stakes. For China public held banks, changes in ownership structure do not affect risk taking. Market forces seem to align the risk-taking behavior of China’s publicly held banks. There is a significant negative correlation between board effectiveness and risk taking.
論文目次:目錄
中文摘要.............................................................................................................................I
ABSTRACT.......................................................................................................................II誌謝...................................................................................................................................III目錄...................................................................................................................................IV
表目錄................................................................................................................................V
第一章 緒論......................................................................................................................1
1.1研究動機與背景.....................................................................................................1
1.2研究目的..................................................................................................................3
第二章文獻探討................................................................................................................5
2.1股權結構影響之相關研究....................................................................................5
2.2董事會效能影響之相關研究................................................................................8
第三章研究方法..............................................................................................................10
3.1研究假說與實證模型..........................................................................................10
3.2變數的操作性定義...............................................................................................16
3.3 研究對象期間、資料來源.................................................................................21
第四章 實證分析...........................................................................................................23
4.1 敘述性統計...........................................................................................................23
4.1.1臺灣銀行業之敘述性統計分析.......................................................................23
4.1.2中國銀行業之敘述性統計分析......................................................................23
4.1.3香港銀行業之敘述性統計分析......................................................................24
4.2相關性統計分析.....................................................................................................24
4.2.1台灣銀行業相關性統計分析............................................................................24
4.2.2中國銀行業相關性統計分析............................................................................25
4.2.3香港銀行業相關性統計分析............................................................................25
4.3複迴歸統計分析.....................................................................................................26
4.3.1台灣銀行業複迴歸統計分析.............................................................................26
4.3.2中國銀行業複迴歸統計分析.............................................................................29
4.3.3香港銀行業複迴歸統計分析.............................................................................30
第五章 結論與建議.......................................................................................................34
參考文獻..........................................................................................................................38
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