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論文中文名稱:內部人持股、董事會結構及股權內部化程度對上市公司風險承擔之影響:金融海嘯前後之比較 [以論文名稱查詢館藏系統]
論文英文名稱:The Effects of Insider Shareholding, Board Structure and Ownership Internalization on Risk-Taking of Publicly Corporation in Taiwan : Comparison between Pre and Post Financial Tsunami [以論文名稱查詢館藏系統]
院校名稱:臺北科技大學
學院名稱:管理學院
系所名稱:商業自動化與管理研究所
畢業學年度:99
出版年度:100
中文姓名:王若瑜
英文姓名:Ruo-Yu Wang
研究生學號:98488014
學位類別:碩士
語文別:中文
口試日期:2011-06-20
論文頁數:136
指導教授中文名:林淑玲
口試委員中文名:張元晨;陳煒朋
中文關鍵詞:內部人持股董事會結構股權內部化風險承擔
英文關鍵詞:Insider ShareholdingBoard StructureOwnership InternalizationRisk-Taking
論文中文摘要:有鑑於過去台灣企業財務弊案頻傳,公司治理成效不彰,在2008年9月爆發之美國雷曼兄弟倒閉引起了全球的金融危機,許多企業受到金融海嘯衝擊而裁員、倒閉,凸顯出企業風險承擔的問題。故本文以台灣上市公司為研究樣本,基於產業特性,排除金融產業,研究期間為2000-2010年9月。且因台灣企業普遍存在家族控制型態,故進一步將企業分為家族企業、非家族企業、集團企業、非集團企業去觀察其不同類型企業之內部人控制對風險承擔影響。
在內部人持股實證發現內部人持股率與企業風險呈現顯著負向影響,即董監事持股率愈高則風險承擔愈低,大股東持股率愈高則風險承擔愈低,經理人持股率愈高則風險愈低,最終控制者個人持股率愈高則風險愈低,金融海嘯前後結果並無顯著差異。在董事會結構實證發現,董事會規模愈大則風險愈低,席次控制率愈高則風險愈提升,獨立董監席次率愈高則風險愈降低,金融海嘯前後結果並無顯著差異。在股權內部化實證發現,大致而言企業內部化程度愈高其風險承擔愈提升,而不同企業類型其結果不相同。此外,以TCRI信用風險作為風險指標時,其實證結果較為一致,而以Beta市場風險作衡量時結果較不一致,表示企業較容易受到市場波動的影響。實證結果中以家族企業與集團企業之結果最為顯著,隨著時間改變亦得到相同顯著結果,顯示台灣企業特有之家族涉入狀況,在有良好的公司治理下,家族企業是可靠的企業類型。
論文英文摘要:Due to the inadequate corporate governance along with corruption and financial scandals, many enterprises in Taiwan had suffered from the Global Financial Tsunami started 2008; ended up reformed, downsized, and, for quite a few, bankrupt. The series of consequent incidents has once again pointed out the importance of risk-taking in enterprise evaluation, which is the theme of this study. In this paper, the author aims at companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE)—firms in finance industry are excluded for certain attributes and peculiarity, with period from Jan. 2000 to Sep. 2010, to examine the influence of insiders to risk-taking level. Furthermore, considering the prevalence of family business in Taiwan, target enterprises are divided into four groups: family business, non-family business, conglomerate, and non-conglomerate.
The empirical study of “insiders’ shareholding” shows that there exists significant negative correlation between insiders’ shareholding and the ability of risk-taking of the target firm, which implies the higher shareholding of boarders, the lower the risk-taking ability. No significant difference is observed after the financial tsunami. The empirical study of “board structure” shows that the larger the scale of the board committee, the lower the risk of the firm, the higher the seats control, the higher the risk of the firm, the higher the number of the independent supervisors, the lower the risk of the firm. No significant difference is observed after the financial tsunami. The empirical study of “Internalization of shareholding” shows that, generally speaking, the higher the internalization of target enterprise, the higher the ability of risk-taking, whereas the result may differ with respect to variety of target firms. In this study, the results of family business and conglomerate business are most significant as time elapsed. It suggests that the specific scenario of family control in Taiwan could be a reliable way to run business under good corporate governance.
論文目次:摘 要 I
英文摘要 II
誌 謝 III
目 錄 IV
表目錄 VI
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究動機 1
1.2 研究目的 2
第二章 文獻探討 3
2.1 家族企業與公司治理 3
2.2 內部人持股與企業風險之相關研究 5
2.3 董事會結構與企業風險之相關研究 8
2.4 股權內部化與企業風險之相關研究 9
第三章 研究設計與方法 11
3.1 研究假說與實證模型 11
3.1.1 內部人持股與風險 11
3.1.2 董事會結構與風險 12
3.1.3 股權內部化與風險 14
3.2 變數的操作性定義 15
3.2.1 應變數之衡量:風險指標 15
3.2.2 解釋變數之衡量 17
3.2.2.1 內部人持股變數 17
3.2.2.2 董事會結構變數 18
3.2.2.3 股權內部化變數 19
3.2.2.4 控制變數 20
3.3 研究對象、期間及資料來源 22
3.3.1研究對象與研究期間 22
3.3.2 資料來源 23
3.4統計方法 23
第四章、實證分析 23
4.1敘述性統計 23
4.1.1 內部人持股之敘述統計 24
4.1.2 董事會結構之敘述統計 25
4.1.3 股權內部化之敘述統計 25
4.1.4 風險與控制變數之敘述統計 26
4.2實證結果 27
4.2.1內部人持股之實證分析 27
4.2.1.1 家族企業 27
4.2.1.2 非家族企業 30
4.2.1.3 家族與非家族企業比較 34
4.2.1.4 集團企業 34
4.2.1.5 非集團企業 38
4.2.1.6 集團與非集團比較 41
4.2.2 董事會結構之實證分析 41
4.2.2.1 家族企業 42
4.2.2.2 非家族企業 45
4.2.2.3 家族與非家族企業比較 49
4.2.2.4 集團企業 50
4.2.2.5 非集團企業 54
4.2.2.6 集團與非集團企業比較 57
4.2.3 股權內部化程度之實證分析 58
4.2.3.1 家族企業 58
4.2.3.2 非家族企業 62
4.2.3.3家族與非家族企業比較 66
4.2.3.4 集團企業 67
4.2.3.5 非集團企業 70
4.2.3.6集團與非集團企業比較 74
第五章 研究結論與建議 76
5.1研究結論 76
5.2研究建議 77
參考文獻 78
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